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Novus Examples

Security

The security category is a first-class hub for auth and PKI SAMPLE fixtures, published sample-only material that must never be used as a real identity. It deepens certificate and key coverage under permanent /files/security/… paths (the older data/security paths remain shipped and unchanged). Expect self-signed X.509 certificates and CSRs, RSA/Ed25519 keys, PKCS#12 SAMPLE bundles, JWT algorithm variants (none/HS/RS), JWKS documents, OAuth token-response JSON, CORS and CSP header text, htpasswd variants, and SSH known_hosts samples. Every private key and token is labelled SAMPLE and deliberately committed for parser, TLS, and auth-harness tests.

Filter security on Browse · 135 files · 8 subcategories

135 of 135 files

Headers

Preview of CORS Response Headers — SAMPLE
headers
251 B
Actual file preview for CORS Response Headers — SAMPLE

CORS Response Headers — SAMPLE

SAMPLE CORS response header block as plain text for header parsers and policy tests.

File
HEADERS · Headers
Use case
API testing
Preview of HSTS Header — SAMPLE
headers
73 B
Actual file preview for HSTS Header — SAMPLE

HSTS Header — SAMPLE

SAMPLE Strict-Transport-Security header for TLS policy scanners.

File
HEADERS · Headers
Use case
API testing

Htpasswd

Jwks

Preview of JWKS (RSA) — SAMPLE
json
514 B
Actual file preview for JWKS (RSA) — SAMPLE

JWKS (RSA) — SAMPLE

SAMPLE JWKS document exposing the Wave G RSA public key for JWT signature verification tests.

File
JSON · Jwks
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWK — EC P-256 Public Key
json
212 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWK — EC P-256 Public Key

SAMPLE JWK — EC P-256 Public Key

A single P-256 public JWK. Its x and y are fixed 32-byte base64url values, left-padded when a coordinate happens to be short — the padding rule that libraries stripping leading zeroes get wrong.

File
JSON · Jwks
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWK — Ed25519 Private Key
json
215 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWK — Ed25519 Private Key

SAMPLE JWK — Ed25519 Private Key

An OKP-type JWK holding the Ed25519 key pair as raw 32-byte x and d values. OKP is the newest JWK key type and the one older JOSE libraries reject outright.

File
JSON · Jwks
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWK — RSA Private Key
json
1.7 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWK — RSA Private Key

SAMPLE JWK — RSA Private Key

The full RSA private key as a JWK, including the CRT parameters p, q, dp, dq and qi. It is the input for testing JWK-to-PEM conversion, where dropping the CRT values quietly costs a large amount of signing performance.

File
JSON · Jwks
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWK — Symmetric oct Key
json
151 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWK — Symmetric oct Key

SAMPLE JWK — Symmetric oct Key

The symmetric HMAC secret used by this wave's HS256 tokens, expressed as an oct JWK. The secret is printed in the specs on purpose so a verifier can be wired up without guessing.

File
JSON · Jwks
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWKS — Duplicate kid
json
748 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWKS — Duplicate kid

SAMPLE JWKS — Duplicate kid

Two keys of different types published under the same kid — what a botched key rotation leaves behind. A resolver that returns the first match silently verifies against the wrong key type instead of reporting the ambiguity.

File
JSON · Jwks
Use case
JWT / JWKS testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWKS — Keys Without kid
json
680 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWKS — Keys Without kid

SAMPLE JWKS — Keys Without kid

A JWK Set whose keys carry no kid at all, which RFC 7517 permits. Verifiers must then fall back to trying candidates by algorithm, and the ones that index the set by kid alone find nothing.

File
JSON · Jwks
Use case
JWT / JWKS testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWKS — RSA, EC, and Ed25519 Keys
json
946 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWKS — RSA, EC, and Ed25519 Keys

SAMPLE JWKS — RSA, EC, and Ed25519 Keys

A three-key JWK Set publishing the public halves of this wave's RSA, P-256, and Ed25519 keys, each with a distinct kid. It is the resolver input for every p7 JWT, so kid selection can be tested against a set that really has more than one candidate.

File
JSON · Jwks
Preview of SAMPLE JWKS — With x5c Certificate Chain
json
5.9 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWKS — With x5c Certificate Chain

SAMPLE JWKS — With x5c Certificate Chain

A JWK carrying the full x5c certificate chain and an x5t#S256 thumbprint alongside the raw n/e values. The x5c array is standard Base64 while every other JWK field is base64url — a real and frequently mis-implemented detail.

File
JSON · Jwks

Jwt

Preview of JWT (HS256) — SAMPLE
jwt
281 B
Actual file preview for JWT (HS256) — SAMPLE

JWT (HS256) — SAMPLE

SAMPLE JWT with alg=HS256 for auth parsers and algorithm-handling tests. Published sample material only.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of JWT (HS384) — SAMPLE
jwt
302 B
Actual file preview for JWT (HS384) — SAMPLE

JWT (HS384) — SAMPLE

SAMPLE JWT with alg=HS384 for auth parsers and algorithm-handling tests. Published sample material only.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of JWT (HS512) — SAMPLE
jwt
324 B
Actual file preview for JWT (HS512) — SAMPLE

JWT (HS512) — SAMPLE

SAMPLE JWT with alg=HS512 for auth parsers and algorithm-handling tests. Published sample material only.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of JWT (none) — SAMPLE
jwt
237 B
Actual file preview for JWT (none) — SAMPLE

JWT (none) — SAMPLE

SAMPLE JWT with alg=none for auth parsers and algorithm-handling tests. Published sample material only.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of JWT (RS256) — SAMPLE
jwt
614 B
Actual file preview for JWT (RS256) — SAMPLE

JWT (RS256) — SAMPLE

SAMPLE JWT with alg=RS256 for auth parsers and algorithm-handling tests. Published sample material only.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of JWT (RS384) — SAMPLE
jwt
614 B
Actual file preview for JWT (RS384) — SAMPLE

JWT (RS384) — SAMPLE

SAMPLE JWT with alg=RS384 for auth parsers and algorithm-handling tests. Published sample material only.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of JWT (RS512) — SAMPLE
jwt
614 B
Actual file preview for JWT (RS512) — SAMPLE

JWT (RS512) — SAMPLE

SAMPLE JWT with alg=RS512 for auth parsers and algorithm-handling tests. Published sample material only.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWS — Flattened JSON Serialization
json
825 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWS — Flattened JSON Serialization

SAMPLE JWS — Flattened JSON Serialization

The single-signature flattened JSON form of the exact same RS256 token shipped in compact serialization. Both encodings must verify to the identical payload, which is the round-trip this pair is for.

File
JSON · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testingAPI testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWS — General JSON Serialization
json
1.1 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWS — General JSON Serialization

SAMPLE JWS — General JSON Serialization

One payload carrying two independent signatures — RS256 and EdDSA — in the General JSON serialization that the compact form cannot express. Multi-signature handling is the part of RFC 7515 most libraries never implemented.

File
JSON · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testingAPI testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWT — alg none, Unsigned
jwt
342 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWT — alg none, Unsigned

SAMPLE JWT — alg none, Unsigned

An unsecured JWS: alg is none and the signature segment is empty, leaving only the trailing dot. Any verifier that accepts it will accept a claim set an attacker wrote, which is why this is the first negative test to run.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWT — EdDSA, Bad Signature
jwt
469 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWT — EdDSA, Bad Signature

SAMPLE JWT — EdDSA, Bad Signature

The EdDSA token with one bit of its signature flipped. Ed25519 verification either succeeds or fails with no partial credit, which makes this the cleanest possible negative case.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testingError handling· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE JWT — EdDSA, Valid
jwt
469 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWT — EdDSA, Valid

SAMPLE JWT — EdDSA, Valid

An EdDSA (Ed25519) token with a fixed 64-byte signature and the same claim set as the RS256 reference. EdDSA signing is deterministic, so this token is reproducible in a way an ES256 one could never be.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE JWT — HS256 with a Published Secret
jwt
422 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWT — HS256 with a Published Secret

SAMPLE JWT — HS256 with a Published Secret

A symmetric HS256 token whose secret is printed in the specs and shipped as an oct JWK, so a verifier can be stood up without any key exchange. It shares its claim set with the RS256 reference token.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Bad Signature
jwt
720 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Bad Signature

SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Bad Signature

The valid RS256 token with the last bit of its signature flipped. Header and payload are byte-identical to the valid twin, so any difference in outcome is entirely down to signature verification.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testingError handling· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Expired
jwt
720 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Expired

SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Expired

A correctly signed RS256 token whose exp passed on 2020-01-01. The signature still verifies, so it isolates expiry handling from every other check — including the libraries that validate the signature and then forget to look at exp.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Signed by the Wrong Key
jwt
1 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Signed by the Wrong Key

SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Signed by the Wrong Key

A perfectly well-formed RS256 signature made with the SAMPLE root key while the kid header still names the leaf key. Verifiers that trust the kid without checking the signature against that exact key accept it.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Valid
jwt
720 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Valid

SAMPLE JWT — RS256, Valid

The reference token for this wave: RS256, signed by the SAMPLE leaf key, with iss, aud, iat, nbf, exp and jti all present and an expiry in 2036. Every other JWT here is a deliberate deviation from it.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testing· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE JWT — Unknown kid
jwt
731 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE JWT — Unknown kid

SAMPLE JWT — Unknown kid

A genuinely valid RS256 signature whose kid names a key that has been rotated out of the JWK set. The right behaviour is a clean key-not-found error, not a silent fallback to whichever key happens to be first.

File
JWT · Jwt
Use case
JWT / JWKS testingError handling· Conversion set

Oauth

Pgp

Pki

Preview of SAMPLE CA Bundle — Root + Intermediate
pem
3.7 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE CA Bundle — Root + Intermediate

SAMPLE CA Bundle — Root + Intermediate

The two CA certificates concatenated in trust-store order, the shape a `--cafile` or `ca-bundle.crt` argument expects. Point a client at this and every other valid p7 leaf becomes verifiable.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Certificate Revocation List — Empty
pem
869 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Certificate Revocation List — Empty

SAMPLE Certificate Revocation List — Empty

A correctly signed CRL with an absent revokedCertificates field — what a CA publishes when it has revoked nothing. Parsers that assume the list is always present tend to fault here rather than report zero entries.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Certificate Revocation List — Stale
pem
971 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Certificate Revocation List — Stale

SAMPLE Certificate Revocation List — Stale

A validly signed CRL whose nextUpdate passed in 2020. Whether a client hard-fails, soft-fails, or silently trusts stale revocation data is a real policy decision, and this is the fixture that reveals which one it made.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Certificate Revocation List (PEM)
pem
971 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Certificate Revocation List (PEM)

SAMPLE Certificate Revocation List (PEM)

The issuing CA's revocation list, PEM-armoured, naming the revoked SAMPLE leaf (keyCompromise) plus a second serial with no matching certificate file — because a real CRL lists serials, not certificates. Signed by the same intermediate that issued them.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE Chain — Leaf + Intermediate
pem
3.6 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Chain — Leaf + Intermediate

SAMPLE Chain — Leaf + Intermediate

The bundle a TLS server actually presents: leaf first, then the issuing CA, with the root deliberately omitted because clients must already trust it. This is the correct-by-construction reference for the chain-order fixtures beside it.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Chain — Leaf + Intermediate + Root
pem
5.5 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Chain — Leaf + Intermediate + Root

SAMPLE Chain — Leaf + Intermediate + Root

The same chain with the self-signed root appended. Sending the root is legal and common, merely wasteful, so a verifier must ignore the extra anchor rather than treat it as an error.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Chain — Missing Intermediate
pem
3.7 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Chain — Missing Intermediate

SAMPLE Chain — Missing Intermediate

Leaf plus root with the issuing CA left out — the single most common TLS misconfiguration, and the one that works in browsers with a cached intermediate and fails everywhere else. Use it to prove a client does not silently paper over the gap.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Chain — Wrong Order
pem
3.6 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Chain — Wrong Order

SAMPLE Chain — Wrong Order

The leaf and intermediate concatenated backwards. Strict servers reject the file outright while tolerant path builders reorder it silently, so it cleanly separates the two behaviours.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Client Authentication Certificate
pem
1.5 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Client Authentication Certificate

SAMPLE Client Authentication Certificate

A mutual-TLS client certificate: EC P-256 subject key, clientAuth EKU only, and an OU naming the fictional access group. Present it to an mTLS endpoint to test client-certificate parsing and EKU enforcement.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Code Signing Certificate
pem
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Code Signing Certificate

SAMPLE Code Signing Certificate

A code-signing certificate (codeSigning EKU, digitalSignature only) issued by the SAMPLE intermediate. It signs nothing real — it exists so signature-verification tooling has an EKU-correct certificate to reason about.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE CSR — Common Name Only
csr
915 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE CSR — Common Name Only

SAMPLE CSR — Common Name Only

A CSR with nothing but a Common Name and no requested extensions — the output of the shortest possible openssl req invocation. Intake code that assumes an extensionRequest attribute exists breaks on it.

File
CSR · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE CSR — Ed25519
csr
452 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE CSR — Ed25519

SAMPLE CSR — Ed25519

An Ed25519 certificate request. Its signature algorithm identifier carries no separate hash OID, which is exactly the field that trips older CSR parsers written around RSA and ECDSA.

File
CSR · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE CSR — Intentionally Corrupt Base64
csr
915 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE CSR — Intentionally Corrupt Base64

SAMPLE CSR — Intentionally Corrupt Base64

An intentionally corrupt PKCS#10 request: the PEM armour is intact but four illegal characters have been substituted into the Base64 body, so decoding fails part-way. It exists to check that a CSR intake path reports a parse error instead of a stack trace or a partially populated record.

File
CSR · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE CSR — RSA with SAN
csr
1.1 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE CSR — RSA with SAN

SAMPLE CSR — RSA with SAN

The CSR shape a modern CA expects: full subject DN, a requested subjectAltName extension, and a self-signature proving possession of the RSA key. Everything a CA intake form needs to parse.

File
CSR · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE CSR — Wildcard
csr
1.1 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE CSR — Wildcard

SAMPLE CSR — Wildcard

A wildcard certificate request covering *.csr.pki.sample.example plus the apex. CA policy engines usually treat wildcards specially, so this is the input that exercises that branch.

File
CSR · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Detached Signature Payload
txt
294 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Detached Signature Payload

SAMPLE Detached Signature Payload

The exact bytes covered by the detached PKCS#7 signature shipped beside it. LF line endings are part of the contract — rewriting the file with CRLF is the fastest way to watch a signature check fail for a reason nobody suspects.

File
TXT · Pki · UTF-8
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE EC P-256 Private Key — PKCS#8
key
241 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE EC P-256 Private Key — PKCS#8

SAMPLE EC P-256 Private Key — PKCS#8

The P-256 key behind the EC leaf certificate, in PKCS#8. Its scalar is derived deterministically from a fixed label so the whole wave reproduces byte for byte.

File
KEY · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE Ed25519 Private Key — PKCS#8
key
119 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Ed25519 Private Key — PKCS#8

SAMPLE Ed25519 Private Key — PKCS#8

The Ed25519 key behind the Ed25519 leaf and the EdDSA JWTs, in PKCS#8. RFC 8410 keys have no traditional-OpenSSL container at all, which is why only one serialisation ships.

File
KEY · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Intermediate CA Certificate (PEM)
crt
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Intermediate CA Certificate (PEM)

SAMPLE Intermediate CA Certificate (PEM)

The issuing CA that signs every leaf in this wave, itself signed by the SAMPLE root and constrained with pathLenConstraint:0 so it cannot mint further CAs. Use it to test intermediate handling and path-length enforcement.

File
CRT · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — EC P-256
pem
1.5 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — EC P-256

SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — EC P-256

The elliptic-curve twin of the reference leaf: identical subject, SANs, EKU and issuer, but a P-256 subject public key instead of RSA-2048. Diff the two to isolate exactly what changes when a deployment migrates key types.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Ed25519
pem
1.5 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Ed25519

SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Ed25519

The third key-type variant of the reference leaf, carrying an Ed25519 subject public key. Older TLS stacks and keystores reject id-Ed25519 outright, which makes this a compact compatibility probe.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Expired
pem
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Expired

SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Expired

A correctly signed leaf whose notAfter fell in the past (2020). The only thing wrong with it is the clock, which makes it the clean way to assert that an expiry error is reported as expiry and not as a signature failure.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — IP Address SAN
pem
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — IP Address SAN

SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — IP Address SAN

A leaf whose SAN carries both a DNS name and an iPAddress entry (192.0.2.10, from the RFC 5737 documentation range). Connecting by literal IP must match the iPAddress entry, never the DNS one.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Not Yet Valid
pem
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Not Yet Valid

SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Not Yet Valid

The mirror of the expired leaf: identical in every respect except that notBefore is 2035, so it is rejected from the other side of the validity window. Pairs with it to prove a verifier distinguishes the two clock errors.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Revoked
pem
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Revoked

SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Revoked

A leaf that is valid in every structural respect and revoked in the matching CRL and OCSP response shipped alongside it. It is the fixture that proves a client actually performs revocation checking rather than stopping at path building.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — RSA-2048
pem
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — RSA-2048

SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — RSA-2048

The reference end-entity certificate for this wave: RSA-2048 subject key, two DNS SANs, serverAuth/clientAuth EKU, and AIA/CRL pointers to the fictional SAMPLE responder. Everything else in the p7 PKI is a deviation from this one.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — SAN/CN Mismatch
pem
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — SAN/CN Mismatch

SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — SAN/CN Mismatch

The certificate's CN is app.pki.sample.example but its only SAN is different.pki.sample.example. RFC 6125 clients must ignore the CN entirely, so this separates modern verifiers from ones still falling back to Common Name.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Self-Signed
pem
1.4 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Self-Signed

SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Self-Signed

An end-entity certificate that signs itself and chains to nothing — the shape a development server produces when nobody ran a CA. It is internally consistent, so the only defect a verifier can find is the missing trust anchor.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Wildcard SAN
pem
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Wildcard SAN

SAMPLE Leaf Certificate — Wildcard SAN

A wildcard certificate covering *.wild.pki.sample.example plus the bare apex. Use it to check that a matcher accepts exactly one label and refuses to stretch the wildcard across a dot.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE OCSP Request (DER)
der
70 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE OCSP Request (DER)

SAMPLE OCSP Request (DER)

The DER OCSPRequest a client sends when checking the reference leaf, with the SHA-1 CertID that RFC 6960 mandates and no nonce extension. POST it at a stub responder to exercise request parsing without a live CA.

File
DER · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingAPI testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE OCSP Response — Good
der
661 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE OCSP Response — Good

SAMPLE OCSP Response — Good

A successful OCSP response asserting status good for the reference leaf, signed directly by the SAMPLE issuing CA. Pair it with the request beside it to stub a responder end to end.

File
DER · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingAPI testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE OCSP Response — Revoked
der
683 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE OCSP Response — Revoked

SAMPLE OCSP Response — Revoked

The OCSP counterpart of the CRL entry: status revoked for the revoked SAMPLE leaf, with the same 2026-03-01 revocation time and keyCompromise reason. Use both against the same certificate to check that CRL and OCSP paths agree.

File
DER · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE OCSP Response — Unauthorized
der
5 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE OCSP Response — Unauthorized

SAMPLE OCSP Response — Unauthorized

The minimal unsuccessful OCSP response: responseStatus unauthorized and no responseBytes at all, which is what a responder returns for a certificate it does not serve. A handful of bytes that regularly breaks clients expecting a signed body.

File
DER · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE PKCS#12 Keystore — Key + Full Chain
p12
5.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE PKCS#12 Keystore — Key + Full Chain

SAMPLE PKCS#12 Keystore — Key + Full Chain

A password-protected PKCS#12 keystore holding the SAMPLE leaf key together with its whole issuing chain, so one import gives a client both an identity and its anchors. The password `novus-p7-sample-p12` is published on purpose; nothing inside is a real credential.

File
P12 · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE PKCS#12 Keystore — No Password
p12
2.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE PKCS#12 Keystore — No Password

SAMPLE PKCS#12 Keystore — No Password

The same leaf key and certificate in a PKCS#12 file with no password and no encryption. Several importers refuse an empty password, prompt anyway, or treat it as the literal empty string, so this is the fixture that finds out which.

File
P12 · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testingError handling· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE PKCS#7 Certificate Bundle (PEM)
pem
5.5 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE PKCS#7 Certificate Bundle (PEM)

SAMPLE PKCS#7 Certificate Bundle (PEM)

A degenerate (certificates-only) PKCS#7 structure holding all three SAMPLE certificates under BEGIN PKCS7 armour — the payload Windows and Java tools distribute as a .p7b. It carries no private key and no signature over any content.

File
PEM · Pki
Preview of SAMPLE PKCS#7 Detached Signature (DER)
der
1.7 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE PKCS#7 Detached Signature (DER)

SAMPLE PKCS#7 Detached Signature (DER)

A detached PKCS#7 SignedData over signed-payload.txt, built without signed attributes so the bytes are reproducible. The content is not embedded, so verification needs both files — exactly the failure mode people hit with .p7s email attachments.

File
DER · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE Root CA Certificate (PEM)
crt
1.9 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE Root CA Certificate (PEM)

SAMPLE Root CA Certificate (PEM)

The self-signed root of the Novus Examples SAMPLE certificate hierarchy (RSA-4096, CA:TRUE, no path-length limit). Install it as the only trust anchor to make the rest of this wave's chains verifiable in a sandbox. Fictional issuer — never a real identity.

File
CRT · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE RSA Private Key — PKCS#8, Encrypted
key
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE RSA Private Key — PKCS#8, Encrypted

SAMPLE RSA Private Key — PKCS#8, Encrypted

The SAMPLE leaf key under PKCS#8 password encryption (BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY, PBES2), password `novus-p7-sample-pkcs8`. Encryption metadata lives inside the ASN.1 here, not in PEM headers — the opposite of the PKCS#1 twin.

File
KEY · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE RSA Private Key — PKCS#8, Unencrypted
key
1.7 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE RSA Private Key — PKCS#8, Unencrypted

SAMPLE RSA Private Key — PKCS#8, Unencrypted

The SAMPLE leaf's RSA-2048 key in unencrypted PKCS#8 (BEGIN PRIVATE KEY) — the modern default and the pair to the PKCS#1 twin beside it. It is deliberately published; treat it as public.

File
KEY · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Paired fixture
Preview of SAMPLE RSA Public Key — PKCS#1
pem
426 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE RSA Public Key — PKCS#1

SAMPLE RSA Public Key — PKCS#1

The same modulus and exponent in the raw PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey container, without the algorithm-identifier wrapper. Libraries routinely accept one armour and reject the other, so the pair is the test.

File
PEM · Pki
Preview of SAMPLE S/MIME Email Certificate
pem
1.8 KB
Actual file preview for SAMPLE S/MIME Email Certificate

SAMPLE S/MIME Email Certificate

An S/MIME-shaped certificate whose SAN is an rfc822Name rather than a DNS name, with the emailProtection EKU and a non-repudiation key usage. Useful for testing address extraction from certificates.

File
PEM · Pki
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set

Ssh

Preview of SAMPLE OpenSSH Public Key — ECDSA P-256
pub
192 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE OpenSSH Public Key — ECDSA P-256

SAMPLE OpenSSH Public Key — ECDSA P-256

The P-256 public key in OpenSSH form, whose blob names the curve twice — once in the key type and once inside the payload. Parsers that read only one of the two mis-handle mismatched keys.

File
PUB · Ssh
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set
Preview of SAMPLE OpenSSH Public Key — RSA
pub
412 B
Actual file preview for SAMPLE OpenSSH Public Key — RSA

SAMPLE OpenSSH Public Key — RSA

The SAMPLE leaf's RSA key in single-line OpenSSH format with a comment — the same key material as the PEM public keys, wrapped the way authorized_keys wants it. Handy for checking that a fingerprint tool agrees across encodings.

File
PUB · Ssh
Use case
Certificate & key testing· Conversion set

Frequently asked questions

Are these real certificates or secrets?

Never. Every key, cert, JWT, and token is published SAMPLE-only material under /files/security/…, do not use them as real identities. Older data/security paths remain shipped and unchanged.

What JWT algorithms are included?

SAMPLE JWTs for none, HS256/384/512, and RS256/384/512, plus expired and intentionally invalid tokens, JWKS, and OAuth token-response JSON.

Do you include CORS and CSP examples?

Yes, plain-text header fixtures for CORS, CSP, HSTS, and a deliberately misconfigured CORS sample for policy linters.